The state monopoly

In Byzantium

Byzantium inherited the Roman law prohibitions on the export of food staples such as wheat, wine and oil, as well as those imposed on materials of strategic importance such as arms and iron. In the fourth century, the export of gold and silver was also prohibited. These prohibitions were clearly aimed at protecting the population against shortages, defending the Empire against an enemy attack and maintaining the monetary balance. The State also reserved the right to exploit certain products, such as salt. In the latter case, it rented the right to exploit the product for a certain period to an individual or a group of individuals, for a fixed sum determined in advance. It also applied the same practice to ensure the receipt of sales taxes.

With regard to the sale of food products, the provisioning of large urban centres in the proto-byzantine period required considerable quantities of food goods (cereals, wine, and oil). The State had the cereals bought in Egypt, Africa and Sicily, the wine and oil in Syria and Palestine, and had them transported to Constantinople and, probably, to certain provincial capitals such as Thessaloniki. Afterwards, they had the victuals distributed to those who had rights. This practice was known as annona. The Abydos tariff (c. 492) doubtless refers to the transport of the annona to the capital of the Oriental Empire. Nevertheless, we must not overestimate the importance of annona in the commerce of the proto-byzantine period. Recent studies have shown that private commerce occupied a major place in the system of exchanges.

The demographic crisis which hit Byzantium from the second half of the sixth century resulted in a drop in demand. This evolution, as well as the Islamic conquest of Syria, Palestine and Egypt led to the abolition of the annona system. From then on, and until the end of the twelfth century, the sale of cereals produced in the planes of Thrace, Bithnia and the coastal regions of Asia Minor was practised by individuals and the State only intervened in the event of emergency, that is to say when there was, above all in Constantinople, a shortage which led to an automatic rise in prices. To remedy this situation, the State would either start distributing its own reserves, or purchasing cereals from other markets and make them available on the capital market. For the rest, the prohibition on wheat exports was necessarily observed since cereal production was not sufficiently abundant to allow its export. It remains disputed as to whether the prohibitions on wine and oil were maintained. During the late period thirteenth – fifteenth century), and when the commercial liberalisation process was finished, the State only intervened in the sale of cereals to prohibit their export when their market price exceeded a certain threshold, that is to say, when the risk of a shortage was imminent.

Silk and its derivatives were the other commercial products which had capital importance for the State. Nevertheless, despite the economic and above all symbolic importance of silk materials, the commerce in silks was not a State monopoly in the strictest sense of the term. All the evidence suggests that in Byzantium, the sale of silk was subjected to State control, but that this was not practised directly by it. Certainly, it is possible that the commerce in raw materials was controlled by the State for brief periods. The apothèkai commerciaires who appear on seals dating from the seventh century and the first years of the eighth century would have been rich entrepreneurs who rented the right to buy and sell silk produced in a certain administrative constituency for a limited period, most often for one year. During the third decade of the eighth century, the system appears to have been modified, and the State to have taken on the commercialisation of the raw material itself. Despite some having reserves about this theory, it remains that the State could grant individuals or companies of individuals who functioned as commercial companies the right to exploit certain resources.

In the tenth century, silk imported into the Byzantine capital was sold to the métaxopratai, a professional body in operation at that time. These métaxopratai then sold it to the sèrikarioi who made silk clothes out of it. The sale of these clothes on the market was undertaken by the vestiopratai. The raw material sales process shows common aspects to what modern economists call a bilateral monopoly. The salesmen as well as the buyers were organised into a cartel in the aim of better controlling prices. Agreements between individuals were not allowed. With regard to the commercialisation of silk materials and clothes, the State imposed restrictions prohibiting the sale of certain categories outside the capital or reserved the exclusive right to buy the most luxurious goods for the needs of the imperial court. Naturally, attempts at contraband also existed. These restrictions were maintained, with some exceptions, until the twelfth century, when the development of sericulture and the silk industry in the Byzantine province as well as the opening up to Italian markets changed the Byzantine economy.

In general, in Byzantium, commerce was usually in the hands of individuals. Certainly, the State was omnipresent so as to defend its strategic interests, but private commerce was the force behind the Byzantine economy. In practice, the State only became involved to protect its prerogatives in fields linked to the imperial majesty (as was the case with some silks), to ensure the regular provisioning of large urban centres (in reality, from the seventh century, of the capital), as well as to monitor transactions with peoples who were not familiar to the monetary economy, as was the case with the Bulgarians until the tenth century. According to this rule, the exploitation of mines and salines was an exception. The emperor Justinian 1^st founded the town of Petra in 535 in the region of Lazikè, to the South-West of the Black Sea, concentrated the entire region’s commerce there and granted the monopoly of this commerce, and more particularly that of salt, to a favourite. The same practice can also be evidenced in the late period, and it clearly shows that around this type of monopoly, contrasting interests rivalled for the control of an enterprise which seems to have been particularly lucrative.

M. G.